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I. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code excludes from gross income damages
received for personal injuries., However, neither the tax code nor
its legislative history define what "personal injury" means in this
context. The only guidance provided to courts when applying the
personal injury exclusion is a treasury regulation that interprets per-
sonal injury damages as "an amount received through prosecution of
a legal suit or action based on tort or tort type rights."2
The Tax Court has used one of two tests to determine whether
1. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1992).
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (amended 1970).
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damages received by a taxpayer were for personal injuries. One test
looks at the nature of the recovery and asks, "in lieu of what were the
damages awarded?"3 The other test looks at the nature of the injury
and asks whether the damages received redress a tort-type, personal
injury.4
In United States v. Burke,5 the United States Supreme Court chose to
apply the first test to a settlement received for a Title VII claim. The
majority held that back pay received by employees in a gender dis-
crimination suit was not received as damages for personal injuries.
The Court reasoned that if the wages had been properly paid in the
ordinary course of business, they would have been fully taxed.6
The dissent in Burke applied the second test and examined
whether the employees' claim was based on a tort or tort-like cause
of action. The dissent concluded that the damages received should
be excluded from gross income because Title VII offers a tort-
like cause of action to employees who suffer employment
discrimination.7
This Comment focuses on the scope of and the justification for the
tax code's personal injury exclusion and its application to specific
cases. This Comment then briefly describes Title VII and the
amendments made by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. This Comment
criticizes the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Burke and
proposes that the proper analysis for determining whether the per-
sonal injury exclusion applies is to examine the underlying claim so
that injured taxpayers are treated similarly and tax policies are fol-
lowed consistently.
II. BACKGROUND OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE § 104(a)(2)
A. Scope and Justification of the Personal Injury Exclusion
The passage of the Sixteenth Amendment in 19138 gave the fed-
eral government the power to assess taxes on individuals and corpo-
rations without regard to apportionment among the states.9 Tax
3. Thompson v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 632, 647 (1987) (citation omitted),
aff'd, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
4. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1299 (1986), afSd, 848 F.2d 81
(6th Cir. 1988).
5. 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
6. Id. at 1874.
7. Id. at 1881 (O'Connor, dissenting).
8. Ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment was completed on February 3,
1913. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, U.S.C.A. (West. Supp. 1987) (historical notes).
9. The Sixteenth Amendment confers on Congress the power to tax United
States citizens on the basis of income: "The Congress shall have power to lay and
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol19/iss4/7
TITLE VII DAMAGES
assessments are measured according to income and rely on the
premise that income is an adequate basis for estimating one's ability
to contribute to the cost of providing public services such as national
defense, poverty relief, and public parks.10 What actually constitutes
income has been an issue since the first tax was assessed,II and the
controversy over income tax assessment continues today.' 2
The Internal Revenue Code (Code) includes in gross income "all
income, from whatever source derived."' 3 Courts define gross in-
come as all "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, over
which the taxpayers have complete dominion."14
Yet some sources of income are excepted from the broad umbrella
of "gross income." For example, the Code does not include in gross
income interest earned on state and local bonds,'5 or the value of
property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance.1 6 Also ex-
cluded from gross income is "the amount of any damages received
. . . on account of personal injuries or sickness."17 Under
§ 104(a)(2), personal injury damages are tax free whether they are
received from a judgment or settlement, in a lump sum or by peri-
10. See generally Klein, et al., Federal Income Taxation 16-18 (8th ed. 1990) (of-
fering other possible methods on which to base taxation and discussing why income
is used as the basis for imposing a tax rather than some other measure).
11. A tax based solely on income was controversial because the Constitution dis-
allowed a direct tax on the people. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
The first income tax was passed as an emergency measure to raise revenue fol-
lowing the Civil War but was repealed in 1872. JEROLD L. WALTMAN, POLITICAL ORI-
GINS OF THE U.S. INCOME TAX 3 (1985). The second income tax was passed as an
amendment to a tariff bill and was subsequently ruled unconstitutional in 1894 in
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895). The Pollock Court
traced the income tax to a tax on land. Equating a land tax to a direct tax, the Court
ruled that the income tax had to be apportioned among the states to be valid. Id. at
637. With the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, all constitutional
barriers were removed and the income tax became purely a political issue. See JOHN
F. WITrE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 79 (1985);
see generally Scott G. Crowley, Note, The Effects of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments
in Changing the Role of the States in the Federal System 1989 B.Y.U. L. REv. 145 (1989).
12. See, e.g., Edward Walsh, Feeling Recession's Pinch, States Slash Spending and Con-
sider Tax Hikes, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1992, at A7 (noting that thousands of angry
residents marched on the Connecticut capitol in protest of the state's first personal
income tax).
13. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1992); Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426,
429 (1955). Specifically, gross income includes but is not limited to compensation
for services, business income, property gain, interest, rents, royalties, dividends, ali-
mony payments, annuities, life insurance proceeds, pension payments, income from
the discharge of indebtedness, partnership income, and income from a decedent.
I.R.C. § 61(a) (1992).
14. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 431.
15. I.R.C. § 103(a) (1992).
16. I.R.C. § 102 (1992).
17. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1992).
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odic payments.' 8 If received in a settlement, the nature of the un-
derlying claim determines whether the payment is excluded.m9
Personal injuries can result in physical harm such as a broken leg
or nonphysical harm such as damage to one's reputation. If a per-
sonal injury results in physical harm all compensatory damages-in-
cluding lost wages-are excludable.20 Thus, if a taxpayer is involved
in an automobile accident and recovers damages for lost wages, pain
and suffering, and medical bills, the entire amount is excludable.
2 l
Even though the Code makes no distinction between physical and
nonphysical personal injuries, the application of § 104(a)(2) has
been problematic where a personal injury results in nonphysical
harm. Damages for nonphysical personal injuries such as breach of a
contract to marry, 22 alienation of affections or surrender of custody
of a minor child,23 loss of consortium,24 wrongful death, 25 and im-
proper termination of employment 26 have been excluded from in-
come. Courts have difficulty with claims for defamation, alternately
denying27 and allowing damages to be excluded.2 8 Whether dam-
ages resulting from civil rights violations may be excluded has also
been a troubling issue for courts. 29
By excluding from income damages received for personal injuries,
Congress continues a policy it began in 1918.30 The exclusion is not
based strict tax logic,3 1 which assumes that all income, however real-
18. Id.
19. Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32, 37 (1972) (holding that the nature of the
claim settled and its validity determines whether a settlement payment is exempt
from taxation).
20. Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55, 56.
21. Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50, 51.
22. McDonald v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 1340, 1342 (1928).
23. Rev. Rul. 74-77, 1974-1 C.B. 33. But see Sol. Op. 24-20-997, 1920-2 C.B. 71,
72 (holding that damages for alienation of affection must be included in determining
gross income) superseded but reiterated in part by Rev. Rul. 74-77, 1974-1 C.B. 33.
24. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 65-29, 1965-1 C.B. 59.
25. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.
26. See, e.g., Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32, 40 (1972).
27. See Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398, 408 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693
(9th Cir. 1983); see also infra text accompanying notes 44-48.
28. See Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1104, 1110 (1983); see also infra text
accompanying notes 49-52.
29. See infra notes 72-76.
30. See Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057,
1066 (1919). As the predecessor of the current § 104(a)(2), § 213(b)(6) excepted
from gross income "[a]mounts received ... as compensation for personal injuries or
sickness, plus the amount of any damages received whether by suit or agreement on
account of such injuries or sickness." Id.; see generally Daniel C. Knickerbocker, Jr.,
The Income Tax Treatment of Damages: A Study in the Difficulties of the Income Concept, 47
CORNELL L.Q. 429 (1962).
31. Bernard Berkowitz & Andrew M. Greenstein, Note, Taxation of Damage Recov-
eries from Litigation, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 345, 346 (1955).
1022 [Vol. 19
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ized, is taxable.32 Rather, the rationale for the personal injury exclu-
sion rests on the humanitarian desire to not further burden those
already injured.33
Precisely because this exception rests on public policy and because
public policy is susceptible to a myriad of interpretations, the provi-
sion has resulted in difficult and inconsistent applications to claim-
ants. United States v. Burke illustrates the inconsistency and the
interpretive dilemmas faced by the Tax Court and circuit courts on
the issue.
B. The Tax Court's Application of the Personal Injury Exclusion
Neither the tax code nor its legislative history defines when a
claimant is deemed to have received damages for a "personal in-
jury." The treasury regulation interpreting the personal injury ex-
clusion refers to those damages received for a violation of "tort or
tort type rights."34 Based on this interpretation, courts distinguish
between tort-based and contract-based rights when applying the per-
sonal injury exclusion. For example, the Tax Court has held that
whether damages received by an employee for wrongful termination
are excluded depends on the basis of the claim. If based on contract
rights, the damages are included in gross income, but, if based on
tort rights, the damages are excluded. 35
32. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955). The
idea that if based on strict tax logic all damages would be taxed as income is implicit
in an early Solicitor's opinion. See Sol. Op. 24-20-997, 1920-2 C.B. 71. This early
opinion held that alienation of affections is not within the exemption (then § 213).
Id. The opinion concluded that, although a personal injury, alienation of affections is
not a reduction of the kind of capital one holds in the human body. (If the alienation
of affections had resulted in sickness, the Solicitor would have awarded damages.) Id.
at 72.
The Solicitor's characterization of the section as an "exemption" for damages
illustrates that tax logic would burden the damages with a tax. To "exempt" is to
excuse something from its obligation. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 571 (6th ed. 1990).
Section 104(a)(2) excepts from income damages received for personal injury alto-
gether, so they are never obligated to be taxed in the first place. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)
(1992).
33. Berkowitz, supra note 31, at 346; see also Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d
693, 696 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing with favor Bernard Berkowitz & Andrew M. Green-
stein, Note, Taxation of Damage Recoveries from Litigation, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 345 (1955)).
Other justifications for the personal injury exclusion include: the plaintiff is merely
made whole by the receipt of damages; the damages constitute a return of capital;
determining which portion of damages would be tax-free is too difficult; and the
damages compensate the taxpayer for a loss of rights that could have been exercised
tax-free. RobertJ. Henry, Torts and Taxes, Taxes and Torts: The Taxation of Personal Injury
Recoveries, 23 Hous. L. REV. 701, 724-29 (1986); see also Jennifer J.S. Brooks, Develop-
inga Theory of Damage Recovery Taxation, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 759, 763-86 (1988).
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (amended 1970).
35. Compare Gunderson v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 464, 465-66 (1979)
19931 1023
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1. From the "In Lieu of What?" Test
Until the mid-1980s, the Tax Court's "in lieu of what" test served
as the standard for determining whether damages received for non-
physical personal injuries could be excluded from income.36 Under
this test, damages received for a personal injury are included if
received in lieu of lost income or wages. 37 The Tax Court used this
standard in cases involving defamation,38 breach of employment
contracts, 39  and cases involving Title VII employment
discrimination.40
The Tax Court did not, however, consistently apply the "in lieu of
what" test. In Roemer v. Commissioner,4 1 a taxpayer attempted to ex-
clude from income damages received in a defamation suit. Roemer,
who worked in the insurance industry, claimed a credit agency de-
famed him in a report sent to an insurance company as part of an
application for an agency license.42 Roemer was not allowed to ex-
clude the damages he received because the injury was to his profes-
sional reputation and hence was not a personal injury.43 The Tax
Court reasoned that the damages were in lieu of lost professional
compensation and thus should be included as income.4 4
(holding that wrongful termination claims were contractual rather than tortious in
nature, and therefore must be included) with Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32, 40
(1972) (holding that portion of wrongful termination suit allocated to tort-like claim
was excludable).
36. Timothy R. Palmer, Internal Revenue Code Section 104(a)(2) and the Exclusion of
Personal Injury Damages: A Model of Inconsistency, 15 J. CORP. L. 83, 87-88 (1989).
37. Id. at 87-88. This tax inclusion test was historically used in the corporate
setting. If damages received by a business were awarded in lieu of lost profits, they
were taxed as regular earnings. Id. at 87. If damages were received for something
other than lost profits, they were taxed at the more favorable capital gains rate. Id.
38. See, e.g., Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693
(9th Cir. 1983).
39. See, e.g., Fono v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 680 (1982) (holding that amounts
received in lieu of a breached employment contract were includable because received
in lieu of wages the employee would have received), affd, 749 F.2d 37 (9th Cir.
1984); Glynn v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 116 (1981) (holding that damages received
for breached employment contract were to be taxed because received in lieu of lost
compensation), afd, 676 F.2d 682 (1st Cir. 1982).
40. See, e.g., Hodge v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 616 (1975). Hodge involved a truck
driver who was denied a promotion because of his race. Id. at 617. Under a Title VII
claim, Hodge recovered the back pay he would have received absent the discrimina-
tory conduct. Id. at 616. Because this back pay was received in lieu of wages, which
would have been included in gross income and taxed, he had to include the damage
award as well. Id. at 619.
41. 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
42. Id. at 399-401.
43. Id. at 405-06.
44. Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398, 410 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th
Cir. 1983). In a lengthy dissent, Judge Forrester offered an alternative method of
analyzing whether the damages received by Roemer for defamation should be taxed.
[Vol. 19
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That same year, a taxpayer with facts similar to Roemer was allowed
to exclude damages received for a defamation claim. In Church v.
Commissioner,45 the taxpayer was allowed to exclude all damages re-
ceived for defamation despite the fact that at least part of the loss
was to his professional reputation.46 The court distinguished Church
from Roemer solely on the basis of Church's artfully drafted claim, 47
which stated that the injury resulting from the defamation included
"shattered dreams, ruined careers, and the mental anguish that...
[is] just as personal as . . . loss of limb."48
2. To the Underlying Claim Test
In 1986, the Tax Court in Threlkeld v. Commissioner4 9 rejected the
"in lieu of what" test articulated in Roemer. Like Roemer, Threlkeld in-
volved a defamation suit and injury to personal and professional rep-
utation.50 Unlike Roemer, the Tax Court held that there was no valid
distinction between damages received for injury to personal reputa-
tion and damages received for injury to professional reputation.5 I
Rather, the court looked at the origin and character of the claim to
determine whether the underlying injury was personal. The court
reasoned that this test more accurately reflected the plain meaning of
the Code.52 Because defamation is a personal injury as defined by
Judge Forrester argued that the "proper inquiry [was] whether the injury sought to
be redressed [was] one to reputation, at all, or only to one's occupation." Roemer, 79
T.C. at 412 (Forrester, J., dissenting).
In determining whether an injury is to reputation or occupation,Judge Forrester
outlined an eight factor approach:
(1) whether the statements made were directed at the person or the occupa-
tion; (2) the geographic region the statements were made in relation to the
person's business; (3) the nature of the occupation; (4) the nature of the
action under local law; (5) the relief sought; (6) the arguments presented to
the jury; (7) the evidence presented to the jury; and (8) how the damages
were classified (if at all).
Id. See also Palmer, supra note 37, at 101-03 (applying Judge Forrester's eight factor
analytical structure to the facts in Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), and
reaching the same result without the inherent structural weaknesses in the majority's
opinion).
45. 80T.C. 1104 (1983).
46. Id. The taxpayer in Church was the Attorney General for the State of Arizona.
He claimed to have been defamed by the newspaper the Arizona Republic. Id. at 1105-
06.
47. Id. at 1108. The disparate results from essentially the same complaints illus-
trates that using the "in lieu of what" test to analyze personal injury claims and
§ 104(a)(2) is inappropriate.
48. Id. at 1109.
49. 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), afd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
50. Id.
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state law, the damages received were excluded from gross income.53
Again in 1986, the Tax Court focused on the underlying nature of
the claim involved in Bent v. Commissioner.54 In Bent, a teacher was not
rehired after publicly criticizing the school administration.55 The
teacher alleged a violation of his First Amendment right to free
speech and brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.56 Because Bent's
claim involved a violation of personal rights resulting in personal in-
jury, the back pay received as damages was excluded from Bent's
gross income. 57
One year later, the Tax Court examined the nature of the claim in
a Title VII suit. In Metzger v. Commissioner,58 a college professor who
was denied tenure alleged discrimination under Title VII and breach
of contract.59 Using the Bent analysis, the Tax Court characterized a
Title VII claim as a tort-type right and held that damages received
were excludable under § 104(a)(2).60
3. And Back, in Part, to the "In Lieu of What?" Test
In the same year Metzger was decided, the Tax Court reverted to
the "in lieu of what" test. In Thompson v. Commissioner,61 the taxpayer
brought a sex discrimination suit against her employer under Title
VII and the Equal Pay Act. The Tax Court held that back pay
awarded under the Equal Pay Act was not in the nature of damages
for a tort or tort-type right, but rather was in the nature of damages
for a contract right.62 Because the employee received her damages
as back pay in lieu of wages, which she would have earned absent the
discrimination, the damages were included as taxable income. 63
However, the Tax Court did allow Thompson to exclude liqui-
dated damages received under the Equal Pay Act. The court found
that the liquidated damages, measured by the back pay due, compen-
sated the employee for the personal injury of sex discrimination.64
53. Id. at 1307-08.
54. 87 T.C. 236 (1986), aftd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987).
55. Id. at 238-39.
56. Id. at 240.
57. Id. at 249.
58. 88 T.C. 834 (1987), aff'd, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988).
59. Id. at 837-39.
60. Id. at 851. The contract damages, however, were not excludable from Metz-
ger's gross income. Id. at 857.
61. 89 T.C. 632 (1987), afd, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
62. Id. The Equal Pay Act is part of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d)(1) (1988). The employee, a government worker, claimed that she was per-
forming the work of a bookbinder but was being paid for a lesser position within the
company. Thompson, 89 T.C. at 633. The Equal Pay Act requires employers to pay
equal wages for equal work regardless of gender. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988).
63. Thompson, 89 T.C. at 648.
64. Id. at 649-50.
1026 (Vol. 19
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Although intangible and difficult to measure, the court held the in-
jury resulted from unfair wages and the damages were thus
excludable. 65
C. The Circuit Courts' Application of the Personal Injury Exclusion
Three circuit courts look at the underlying claim when determin-
ing whether damages received qualify for the personal injury exclu-
sion.66 One circuit court uses the "in lieu of what test."
67
The Third Circuit in 1987 affirmed the Tax Court's holding in Bent
v. Commissioner68 and agreed that the issue of whether damages may
be excluded requires the court to examine the nature of the underly-
ing claim. 69 The court held that because the nature of the injury in a
§ 1983 claim was personal, 7o the entire amount of the award re-
ceived could be excluded from the taxpayer's income. The court fur-
ther held that even the portion of the amount that represented lost
wages was excludable because "an award of damages for the viola-
tion of a constitutional right may be measured in whole or in part by
the amount of lost wages." 71
The Sixth Circuit in 1988 adopted the underlying claim test and
affirmed the Tax Court's decision in Threlkeld v. Commissioner.72 The
Tax Court had based its inquiry on whether the underlying injury
was personal in nature. 73 The Sixth Circuit agreed that this was the
proper inquiry and further found that the underlying injury was per-
sonal. 74 Because all damages were received due to a personal injury,
they could be excluded from the taxpayer's gross income.75
The Ninth Circuit in 1983 also applied the underlying claim test
65. Id. at 650.
66. These circuits are the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal.
67. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
68. 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987).
69. Id. at 70.
70. The Tax Court and the Third Circuit looked to recent United States
Supreme Court decisions where the fundamental nature of the claim also indicated
that the injury was personal in nature and concluded that the § 1983 claim in Bent was
for a personal injury. See Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299
(1986) (holding that lost earnings are a portion of compensatory damages for per-
sonal injuries of mental anguish and emotional distress); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
261 (1985) (determining that every cause of action under § 1983 results from per-
sonal injury); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) (providing a historical overview
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
71. Bent, 835 F.2d at 70.
72. 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
73. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1298 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th
Cir. 1988).
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and overturned the Tax Court's decision in Roemer v. Commissioner.76
The court stated that the relevant distinction was whether the injury
was personal or nonpersonal, not physical or nonphysical. 77 Analyz-
ing Roemer's defamation claim under relevant state law, 78 the court
found the claim to be one for a personal injury. Although lost future
earnings-a nonpersonal consequence of the injury-was the mea-
sure of damages, the court refused to define the personal nature of
the injury by the method used to measure its effect.TO The court held
that because the resulting injury was personal, the damages were ex-
cludable under § 104(a)(2).80
Departing from the approach of these three circuits, the Fourth
Circuit in 1989 upheld the Tax Court's application of the "in lieu of
what" test in Thompson v. Commissioner.8 1 The Fourth Circuit recog-
nized that sex discrimination suits are tort actions and that damages
received in such suits are received for a personal injury. 82 The court
went on, however, to conclude that because the back pay would have
been taxed if received as wages, the award was taxable because the
wages would have been taxable.83
III. TITLE VII AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. Background of Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act84 provides a cause of action to an
employee who has been the victim of an employer's85 discriminatory
76. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
77. Id. at 697.
78. Id. The court turned to California law because "there is no general federal
common law of torts . . . nor controlling definitions in the tax code." Id. (citations
omitted).
79. Id. at 699.
80. Id. at 700.
81. 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
82. Id. at 712.
83. Id.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
Title VII provides that it is an unlawful employment practice:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
condition, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
Id.
85. Title VII applies to an employer "engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
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conduct.86 Congress intended Title VII to eliminate overt discrimi-
nation, as well as practices that appeared fair in form but were dis-
criminatory in practice. 87 It was Congress' intent that Title VII be
the vanguard for eliminating employment discrimination throughout
the nation. 88
Under Title VII, some discrimination by employers is allowed.
Employers may discriminate using a system that measures earnings
by quality or quantity of production, by using a professionally devel-
oped ability test, or because employees work in different locations.89
These discriminatory practices do not violate Title VII provided the
employer has no intent to discriminate.90 Judicially created excep-
tions, such as a bona fide seniority or merit system, 9' may also ease
the employer's burden. One commentator warns, however, that
these judicially created defenses "threaten to swallow Congress' an-
tidiscrimination mandate" because the defenses are based on costs
an employer must incur to avoid violating Title VII provisions.92
Plaintiffs may pursue Title VII claims under several theories.93 A
(1988). Tax exempt bona fide private organizations, such as nonprofit religious insti-
tutions, are exempt from Title VII. Id.
86. An employee must be the object of the discrimination in order to bring suit
under Title VII. Patee v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 803 F.2d 476, 477 (9th Cir.
1986) (citing Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 915 (1977)).
87. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (providing "good intent
or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures.., that
operate as 'built in headwinds' against minority groups.").
88. Melissa M. McGrath, Note, Employment Discrimination: Are Title VII Protections
Under a Disparate Impact Analysis Drastically Diminished? Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Antonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989), 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 187, 190 (1990). The author cites
from the preamble of the Civil Rights Act: "[T]he opportunity for employment with-
out discrimination . . . is a right of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States, and.., it is the national policy to protect the right of the individual to be free
from such discrimination." Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., re-
printed in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1964, at 2001, 2009 (1968)).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988).
90. Id.
91. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353-54
(1977) (holding that a bona fide seniority system was allowed even though it perpetu-
ated the effects of discrimination).
92. Mark S. Brodin, Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 318, 365 (1987).
93. The prima facie test is derived from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green where
the plaintiff had to show that:
(1) he or she belonged to a protected minority; (2) he or she was qualified
for the job the employer was seeking to fill; (3) he or she was rejected de-
spite being qualified; (4) that the position remained open thereafter and the
employer continued to seek qualified applications for the position.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Once an employee
establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to
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common claim involves disparate treatment by an employer, where
an employee feels he or she has been treated less favorably because
of race, color, religion, or national origin. 94 Retaliatory action by an
employer95 and constructive discharge96 are also theories under
which a Title VII suit may be brought.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 97 first established the disparate impact the-
ory as a basis for a Title VII claim. A disparate impact claim arises
when an employee is discriminated against by an employer's facially
benign action.98 Griggs held that an employer's practice of requiring
applicants to possess a high school diploma (or its equivalent), while
neutral on its face, discriminated in practice against persons of
color.99 The Court further held that the criteria used to distinguish
the employees had no "demonstrable relationship to successful per-
formance of the jobs."lOO
show a legitimate reason for the discrimination. Id. The employer's defense varies
according to the type of discrimination claim brought. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 260 (1981) (allowing the defendant em-
ployer to show a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its disparate treatment of
the complaining employee); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626
(1987) (allowing an employer to advance a defense based on an affirmative action
plan). If the employer offers a legitimate reason, the employee then has the opportu-
nity to rebut the employer's evidence. See, e.g., Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (holding that
employee may still prevail by showing that the criterion used by the employer to
advance a legitimate business purpose was merely a "pretext" rather than the actual
reason for the decision).
94. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 796 (claiming that the employer failed
to rehire employee because of his race). When bringing a Title VII suit under this
theory, the plaintiff must show that the employer intended to discriminate against the
employee because of a suspect classification. International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
95. See, e.g.,Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987). To es-
tablish a discriminatory discharge, a plaintiff must show that "(1) he engaged in activ-
ity protected under Title VII, (2) his employer subjected him to an adverse
employment action, and (3) the employer's action is causally linked to the protected
activity." Id. at 1411 (citing Yartzoffv. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 939 (1990); Miller v. Fairchild Indus., 797 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056 (1990)).
96. See, e.g., Parrett v. City of Connersville, 737 F.2d 690, 695 (7th Cir. 1984)
(allowing a constructive discharge claim if the plaintiff could show that the employer
intentionally rendered working conditions so intolerable the employee felt com-
pelled to quit).
97. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
98. The employees in Hutcheson v. Dean, Civil Action No. 3-85-119 (E.D. Tenn.
1984), whose settlement payments were at issue in United States v. Burke, brought a
Title VII action under this theory.
See generally Brodin, supra note 93, at 318-24 (exploring useful background infor-
mation of Title VII); McGrath, supra note 88, at 201-11 (arguing that a 1989 case
erroneously diminished the viability of disparate impact suits).
99. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.
100. Id. at 431.
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If a court finds that an employer has engaged (or is engaging) in
an unlawful employment practice, it may enjoin the employer from
using that practice and order appropriate affirmative action.101 Af-
firmative action may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or
rehiring of the employee (with or without back pay) or any other ap-
propriate equitable relief.102 Only one circuit court has awarded a
plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages based upon an em-
ployer's discrimination.103
Upon a finding of discriminatory conduct by an employer, an em-
ployee is presumed to be entitled to back pay, as well as retroactive
promotion or reinstatement.104 Back pay may be denied only if de-
nial "would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicat-
ing discrimination throughout the economy and making persons
whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination."105 This
remedy furthers the dual goals of Title VII: to make an injured em-
ployee whole and to deter employers from engaging in discrimina-
tory practices in the first place.106
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
The Civil Rights Act of 1991107 amended Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964108 by significantly expanding the remedies avail-
able to aggrieved employees. Compensatory and punitive damages
are now expressly available to employees who prove intentional dis-
crimination by their employer.OO These expanded remedies are,
however, not available to Title VII suits brought under a disparate
impact theory.I Io
Compensatory damages now available include future pecuniary
losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish,
loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses.", Punitive
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
102. Id.
103. Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1363-64 n.14 (11th Cir. 1982).
104. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975).
105. Id. at 421.
106. Id. at 422.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1992).
108. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-16. The 1991 amendment also amends the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1870); the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 1210 (1990); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1967); and the Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1976); see also Irving M. Geslewitz, Understanding the 1991 Civil Rights
Act, 38 PRAC. LAw. 57, 57-58 (Mar. 1992).
109. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.)
1072 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(l)).
110. Id.
111. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.)
1073 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3)).
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damages are available if the employer acted with malice or with reck-
less indifference to the employee's federally protected rights.'12 The
sum of any compensatory1 3 and punitive damages, however, cannot
exceed specified maximum amounts, which are determined accord-
ing to the number of persons employed by the offender.'14
Congress intended the 1991 amendment to facilitate proof of em-
ployment discrimination and to deter discriminatory conduct by em-
ployers.11 5 The legislation reversed five 1989 United States
Supreme Court decisions that were viewed as unfavorable to those
seeking relief from employment discrimination.16 Congress used
the 1991 amendment to send a message to the Supreme Court that
its views on civil rights were not as expansive as those on Capitol
Hill. 17
Whether the 1991 amendment's expanded remedies apply retroac-
tively has not yet been determined. Even though the United States
Supreme Court has faced this question, the Court has declined to
settle the issue.'18 Several circuit courts, including the Eighth Cir-
cuit, have already ruled that the expanded remedies are not available
retroactively. 19 Commentators note that the question of retroactiv-
ity promises to be a "hotly debated" issue.120
112. Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)). It is interesting to note that
government employers, including agencies and subdivisions, are exempted from this
provision. Id.
113. For purposes of this limitation, compensatory damages do not include any
amounts attributable to back pay. Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2)).
114. Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3)). The maximum amount in
damages a plaintiff can receive is determined by the size of the employer, measured
by the number of employees:




300,000 over 500 employees
Id.
115. Geslewitz, supra note 108, at 58.
116. See John M. Husband & Jude Biggs, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Expanding
Remedies in Employment Discrimination Cases, 1992 COLO. LAw. 881 (May 1992) (citing
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989);
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); and Lorance v. AT&T, 490 U.S. 900 (1989)).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1255, 1255 (1992) (remand-
ing the case for further consideration without deciding upon the issue of
retroactivity).
119. See, e.g., Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370, 1378 (8th Cir.
1992) (holding that the expanded remedies under the 1991 amendments are not
available retroactively); see also Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1992) (leav-
ing open the issue of whether the expanded remedies are available retroactively).
120. Husband & Biggs, supra note 121, at 886.
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IV. UNITED STATES V. BURKE 1 2 1
A. The Facts
In 1984, a group of employees filed a Title VII action against the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).122 The employees alleged that
TVA engaged in unlawful gender-based discrimination in its pay-
ment of salaries.123 The complaint generally alleged that TVA's sal-
ary and wage structure intended to and resulted in disparate
treatment of female employees.124 Specifically, the employees com-
plained that in 1981 TVA had increased the salaries of employees in
certain male-dominated positions and had decreased the salaries of
employees in certain female-dominated positions.125 The employees
sought to enjoin TVA from further wage discrimination and sought
back pay in an amount sufficient to eliminate the discrimination.126
The plaintiffs were employees of TVA and members of the Office
and Professional Employees International Union, AFL-CIO (Union).
The plaintiffs sought but were denied certification as a class. The
court found that "[tihe presence of [the Union] in this action insures
that the interests of the class will be protected." 27 TVA filed a coun-
terclaim against the Union alleging fraud, misrepresentation, breach
of contract, conspiring with the intent to defraud, and interference
with contractual relationships128 and sought approximately
$30,000,000 in damages.129
121. 112S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
122. Id. at 1869. The Tennessee Valley Authority is a corporation created by
Congress in 1933 to maintain and develop the Tennessee River and its tributaries in
the interests of national defense, agricultural and industrial development, and navi-
gation. 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1988).
123. Burke v. United States, 90-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,203 (E.D. Tenn. Mar.
20, 1990), rev'd, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
124. Id. at 83,745. TVA employees were divided into six pay schedules: clerical
and general services; custodial; public safety; administrative; engineering and scien-
tific; and aid and technical. TVA determined each schedule's wage structure by sur-
veying various private employers in the surrounding area. The survey results were
used by TVA to bargain for wages and salaries with the union. Id.
In 1979-81, the salary survey and schedule was redefined for the clerical and
general services, custodial, and public safety employees. In Hutcheson v. Dean, Civil
Action No. 3-85-119 (E.D. Tenn. 1984), the case underlying the Burke decision, the
plaintiffs were clerical and general services employees, a pay schedule staffed
predominantly by women. As a result of the new survey area, the plaintiffs did not
receive the increase in pay similar to those in the other three salary schedules. The
other schedules encompassed primarily male employees. Id.
125. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1869.
126. Id.; see also Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1120 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd,
112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992). They also sought costs, attorneys' fees and other warranted
relief. Id.
127. Burke, 90-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 83,745 n.l.
128. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1869.
129. Burke, 929 F.2d at 1120.
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On motion for summary judgment by TVA, the district court held
for the employees, finding that they had "made a prima facie case of
disparate impact by showing that TVA adopted a facially neutral
course of conduct (by changing the method it used to fix salary
schedules for certain employee groups) which had a significantly ad-
verse impact on female employees."130 The district court further
noted that there was significant evidence of discriminatory intent on
the part of TVA. 131
The parties thereafter entered into a settlement agreement that
provided for a lump-sum payment of five million dollars to those em-
ployees affected by the challenged salary schedule at the time of the
discriminatory conduct.132 The settlement amount was to be distrib-
uted at the Union's discretion.133 When it proved administratively
unfeasible for the Union to distribute the fund, t34 the agreement was
amended so that TVA was to distribute the money directly to the
employees under a formula established by the Union.t35 The
formula took into consideration an employee's length of service in
the affected salary schedule and rates of pay throughout that time
period. 136 TVA agreed to distribute the funds on the condition that
it be allowed to withhold federal taxes.' 3 7
TVA distributed the settlement amount to the employees accord-
ing to the Union's formula and, as promised, withheld federal in-
come tax and FICA taxes' 38 from each employee's share.139
130. Burke v. United States, 90-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,203, p. 83,746 (E.D.
Tenn. Mar. 20, 1990), rev'd, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1867
(1992).
131. Id.
132. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1869 (1992). The settlement also
required direct payment of $4200 from TVA to plaintiff Hutcheson, a new regional
salary survey, an amendment to the bargaining agreement between the union and
TVA to provide a method of salary arbitration, and the dismissal of TVA's counter-
claim. Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1120 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
1867 (1992).
133. Burke, 929 F.2d at 1120.
134. Id. It was anticipated that over 8000 employees were employed in the offend-
ing pay schedule and would be entitled to a portion of the settlement proceeds. Id.
135. Id.
136. Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1120 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
1867 (1992).
137. Id. The Sixth Circuit pointed out that the union reluctantly agreed to this
provision. The court also notes that TVA did not feel compelled to withhold taxes
when it made its direct payment to plaintiff Hutcheson, nor when it turned over to
the union the money leftover as undistributable. TVA only withheld taxes from em-
ployees included in the Hutcheson suit, who in turn filed the refund action. Id.
138. FICA stands for Federal Insurance Contributions Act. I.R.C. § 3101(a)
(1992) (imposing percentage tax on "wages"); I.R.C. § 3121(a) (1992) (defining
"wages" as "all remuneration for employment").
139. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1869 (1992).
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Challenging the propriety of the withholding, the employees filed a
claim for a tax refund with the Internal Revenue Service.140 The
Service denied their claim, and the employees brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee to
recover the amounts withheld.14, They claimed the amount they re-
ceived according to the terms of the settlement agreement should be
excluded from their respective gross incomes under § 104(a)(2) of
the Internal Revenue Code because sexual discrimination resulted in
personal injury.
B. The Courts' Analysis
1. The District Court
The district court identified the question presented as "whether
the damages were excludable from income under § 104(a)(2) of the
Internal Revenue Code."142 As foundation for its analysis, the court
pinpointed the key issue as a determination of the nature of the un-
derlying cause of action for which the damages were received.' 43
The court stated that the nature of a Title VII action "sounds basi-
cally in tort-the statute merely defines a new legal duty, and autho-
rizes the courts to compensate a plaintiff for the injury caused by the
140. Id.
141. Id. More than 1000 employees who had received a share of the distribution
less the tax withheld filed a claim. The claim was later amended, dismissing without
prejudice all but three employees: Therese A. Burke, Cynthia R. Center, and Linda
G. Gibbs. Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1120 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S.
Ct. 1867 (1992).
The minimal amounts at issue shed light on the possible reasons most plaintiffs
sought dismissal. Burke received $764.94 from the settlement and TVA withheld
$152.99 in federal income tax and $54.69 in FICA tax. Carter received $927.55 from
the settlement and TVA withheld $185.51 in federal income tax and $66.32 in FICA
tax. Gibbs received $572.95 from the settlement and TVA withheld $114.39 in fed-
eral income tax and $40.97 in FICA tax. The paltry sum at stake, coupled with the
uncertainty of the law, was a disincentive for pursuing the claim. Burke v. United
States, 90-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,203, p. 83,747 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 1990),
rev'd, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991), revd, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
It is interesting to note that, while the employees sought the refund for the taxes
withheld pursuant to FICA, neither the parties nor the courts below addressed the
issue of whether these amounts were improperly withheld. United States v. Burke,
112 S. Ct. 1867, 1869 n.l (1992).
142. Burke v. United States, 90-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,203, p. 83,744 (E.D.
* Tenn. Mar. 20, 1990), rev'd, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1867
(1992).
143. Id. at 83,747. The district court cited numerous cases establishing the basis
for analyzing a § 104(a)(2) claim. See, e.g., Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 81,
84 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that the court "must look to the nature of the underlying
injury to determine excludability under section 104(a)(2)").
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defendant's wrongful breach."144 The court recognized that injuries
redressed under Title VII are personal injuries. 145
The district court then addressed the types of remedies available
under a Title VII claim.146 Generally, Title VII discrimination pro-
vides employees with a claim for back pay, measured by what they
would have received absent the employer's discriminatory con-
duct. 147 Although payments of unpaid wages are not excludable
under § 104(a)(2),148 the court stated that Title VII awards may be
excluded to the extent they do not constitute back pay.149
In analyzing whether the Title VII award at issue in Burke was ex-
cludable from income, the district court again returned to the nature
of the underlying injury.150 The court recognized that the Title VII
loss of income damage award may simply be the best measure of the
loss incurred from the underlying personal injury.151 In the alterna-
tive, the court continued, the loss of income could be analyzed by
asking the question "in lieu of what were the damages awarded?"15 2
Apparently deciding that the "in lieu of what" alternative was the
better of the two, the court first looked at TVA's intent in making the
144. Burke, 90-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 83,747 (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189, 195 (1974)).
145. The district court, although never conclusively stating this proposition,
quoted without qualification several cases supporting this point. Id. (citing Thomp-
son v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709, 712 (4th Cir. 1989) ("Sex discrimination actions
in general are tort or tort-type actions and damages awarded for violation of that
right are damages for personal injuries."); Metzger v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834
(1987) ("The injuries for which relief is sought under Title VII are 'personal inju-
ries.' "), aff'd, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988).
146. The Supreme Court stated in its opinion that "[riemedial principles thus fig-
ure prominently in the definition and conceptualization of torts." United States v.
Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1871 (1992). As support for this proposition, the Court
noted that " 'an action for damages' is 'an essential characteristic of every true tort,'
and that, even where other relief, such as an injunction, may be available, 'in all such
cases it is solely by virtue of the right to damages that the wrong complained of is to
be classed as a tort.' " Id. (quoting SirJohn William Salmond, SALMOND ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 9 (R.F.V. Heuston ed., 12th ed. 1957)).
147. Burke, 90-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 83,748.
148. Id. (citing Hodge v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 616, 619 (1975)).
149. Id. Because prior to the 1991 amendments back pay was the only remedy for
Title VII and "back pay is never excludable," this analysis is circular and hollow.
150. Burke v. United States, 90-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,203 (E.D. Tenn. Mar.
20, 1990), rev'd, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992). The
district court stated "excludability depends 'on what was the injury complained of
.... 'Id. at 83,748 (quoting Metzger v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834, 858 (1987),
afd, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988)).
151. Id. (quoting Metzger v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 632 (1987)).
152. Id. (citing Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1104, 1107 (1983); Yates v.
Commissioner, 58 T.C. 961, 972 (1972), aff'd, 480 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1973); Raytheon
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payment. While back pay was never mentioned in the settlement ne-
gotiations, the court found that the employees' complaint made it
clear that "the very core of the case was the recovery of wage defi-
ciencies."'1 3 Based on the language of the complaint, the manner in
which the money was allocated, and the fact that the employees
agreed in the amended settlement to the sum "less any taxes which
TVA may be required to pay,"' 54 the court concluded the employees
accepted that the money was to be received in the nature of back
pay.' 55 Because the payments were back pay, the distribution must
be included in the determination of the employees' gross income.156
2. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
The employees appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
raising the question of whether the damages they received in settle-
ment for their sex discrimination claims could be excluded under
§ 104(a)(2). 15 7 According to the Sixth Circuit, the answer depended
solely on whether the injuries the employees suffered were personal
and tort-like.'5 8 The court refused to extend its inquiry further into
the nature of the damages received (as the district court had done) if
the injuries were personal and tort-like.159
The court examined a long line of cases which held that injuries
from discrimination were injuries to the individual rights and dignity
of a person. 160 The court concluded that such injuries are personal
in nature. 16, The court rejected the government's argument that the
153. Burke v. United States, 90-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,203 p. 83,749 (E.D.





157. Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S, Ct. 1867
(1992). The court reviewed the question de novo.
158. Id. at 1121, 1123. The court relied on Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.
1294 (1986), ajfd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988). In Threlkeld, the Tax Court deter-
mined by a 15-1 vote that "whether the damages received are paid on account of
'personal injuries' should be the beginning and the end of the inquiry." Threlkeld, 87
T.C. at 1299.
159. Burke, 929 F.2d at 1123.
160. Id. (citing inter alia Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987) (hold-
ing that racial discrimination is an injury to the individual rights of a person);
Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709, 712 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that sex
discrimination is a personal injury); Tiliman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n,
Inc., 517 F.2d 1141, 1143 (4th Cir. 1975) (stating that an action brought for racial
discrimination fundamentally seeks to redress a tort); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.
189, 195-96 n.10 (1974) (likening racial discrimination to a common law dignitary
tort)).
161. Burke, 929 F.2d at 1122 (citing inter alia Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d
145, 148 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that injuries resulting from age discrimination in
1993]
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damages available under Title VII distinguish Title VII injuries from
other discrimination injuries.' 62 The court simply refused to look
beyond the personal nature of the injury.163
In addition to arguing that the damages were taxable back pay, the
government also argued the exclusion would be unfair because ex-
cluding awards based on back pay places employees in a better posi-
tion than they would have been had the discrimination not
occurred. 164 While acknowledging the superficial logic of this prop-
osition, 165 the court rejected the argument citing a decision from the
previous year. 16 6
The court of appeals reversed the district court and held that the
employees could exclude from gross income the amount received
from the settlement of their Title VII claim as damages received for
personal injury under § 104(a)(2). 167 The court further held that a
victim of discrimination who had recovered lost pay would not be
treated differently than the victim of a physical tort who had recov-
ered lost pay.168
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act are personal injuries for the
purposes of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)); Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 662 (3d Cir.
1990) (holding that age discrimination is a tort-like personal injury for the purposes
of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)); Metzger v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834, 851 (1987) (holding
that damages received for sex and national origin discrimination were excludable as
damages for personal injuries under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)), affd, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir.
1988).
162. Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1122 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
1867 (1992).
The government focused on the consequences of the employer's Title VII viola-
tion, not the injury that resulted to the employees. The government essentially ar-
gued that the "in lieu of what" test should apply and, thus, the back pay damages
were purely economic rather than tort or tort-type. Implicit in this argument is the
government's concession that the underlying injury is personal. Otherwise the dam-
ages could not be transformed from "personal" to "economic." Id.
163. Burke, 929 F.2d at 1122. The court stated that "the government misappre-
hends the proper inquiry for determining excludability under § 104(a)(2)." Id.
164. Id. at 1123.
165. Id.
166. See Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145, 150 (6th Cir. 1990). Pistillo in-
volved an age discrimination suit brought under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA). Id. at 145. The court held that the employee was personally
injured because he suffered his employers' indignities and insults. Id. at 150. As
such, he was entitled to the same tax treatment as one who had suffered physical
injuries despite any hypothetical tax unfairness. Id.
167. Senior Circuit Judge Weliford dissented. He distinguished the cases applied
by the majority and argued that damages received under the settlement were includ-
able because they were meant to compensate for lost earnings. Burke v. United
States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1124-26 (6thCir. 1991) (Wellford,J., dissenting), rev'd, 112 S.
Ct. 1867 (1992).
168. Id. at 1122; see also Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 664 (3d Cir. 1990)
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3. The United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict among the circuit courts concerning the exclusion of Title
VII back pay awards under § 104(a)(2).1 69 The Court first deter-
mined that the settlement awards constituted gross income within
the broad reach of the Internal Revenue Service.170 It then focused
on whether the awards fell within the personal injury damages excep-
tion.' 7 1 The Court turned to the 1960 Service regulation that identi-
fies "personal injury" in reference to tort or tort-type principles. 1
7 2
The Court identified a tort as a civil wrong, other than a breach of
contract,' 73 for which a broad range of damages are available to
compensate the plaintiff.174
The Court stated that "[i]t is beyond question that discrimination
in employment .. .causes grave harm to its victims."'75 Yet the
Court reasoned that remedies available to redress that injury are
merely back pay, injunctions, and other equitable relief, in contrast
to traditional tort remedies.176 The Court further reasoned that be-
cause Congress declined to compensate plaintiffs for anything more
than the wages properly due them and that those wages would have
been taxed, Title VII did not redress a tort-type injury within the
meaning of § 104(a)(2) and its accompanying regulation.177 The
majority reinstated the district court's decision and denied the exclu-
sion of the damages received for Title VII violations from gross
income. 178
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia suggested a common sense
interpretation of personal injury rather than an interpretation based
on the Service regulation because the "IRS's 'tort rights' formula-
169. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992). To illustrate the conflict, the
Court compared the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Burke to Sparrow v. Commissioner, 949
F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3009 (1992) and Thompson v. Com-
missioner, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989), both holding that Title VII awards are not
excludable. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1870 n.3.
170. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1870.
171. Id. at 1870-74.
172. Id. at 1870.
173. Id. The Court relied on a noted scholar on the subject of torts: "A 'tort' has
been defined broadly as a 'civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which the
court will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages.' " Id. (quoting W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 2 (1984)).
174. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1871 (1992) (noting that "one of the
hallmarks of traditional tort liability is the availability of a broad range of damages to
compensate the plaintiff 'fairly for injuries caused by the violation of his legal
rights.' ") (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 (1978)).
175. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1872.
176. Id. at 1873.
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tion . . . is not within the range of reasonable interpretation of the
statutory text."' 79 Although the term "personal injuries" can be
read to include any noncontractual interest, reference to the statute's
entire phrase "personal injury or sickness" suggests the proper read-
ing connotes only injuries to physical or mental health.l80 Justice
Scalia's approach would allow personal injury damages to be ex-
cluded only if the damages were received on account of injuries to
the recipient's physical or mental health.181 He reasoned that be-
cause recovery under Title VII does not depend on a showing of an
injury to one's physical or mental health, the only redressable legal
injury is the antecedent economic deprivation that produced the vio-
lation in the first place.182 Thus, settlement payments in respect to
back pay would not be received on account of personal injuries.
Justice Souter also concurred, but based his analysis on the broad
dichotomy between contract and tort and the method by which stat-
utes are generally interpreted .183 He recognized arguments placing
Title VII damages on both sides of the line of the contract-tort de-
bate but stopped short of endorsing either.'84 RatherJustice Souter
proposed that the default rule of statutory interpretation determine
the issue: exclusions from income are to be narrowly construed.'8 5
Thus, because Title VII damages do not clearly fit into the personal
injury exclusion, they are an accession to wealth.186
Justice O'Connor,joined by Justice Thomas, dissented and argued
that the remedies available do not fix the character of the right as-
serted.187 In contrast to Justice Scalia's position, the dissent de-
ferred to the Service regulation interpreting the phrase "damages
received" in reference to tort-type rights. l88 Justices O'Connor and
Thomas stated that whether Title VII claims are based on the same
type of rights torts are based depends on the nature of the statute
and the type of claim brought under it.189
Functionally, the dissent argued that Title VII operates to provide
179. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1875 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-45 (1984)).
180. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1875. In his analysis, Scalia applied the familiar maxim
noscitur a sociis: a word is known by the company it keeps. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1877 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 1877-78.
185. Id. at 1878.
186. Id.
187. Id. (O'Connor, Thomas, J.J., dissenting).
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a traditional tort-type right rather than a contractual right.19 0 Fur-
thermore, back pay damages not only offset specific losses but, simi-
lar to tort damages, also serve the public purpose of dissuading
employers from engaging in undesirable conduct.19 1
The dissent also pointed to two United States Supreme Court de-
cisions holding that other federal civil rights suits were analogous to
personal injury suits because the law protected individuals against
tort-type personal injuries.192 The dissent addressed and dismissed
the majority's alternative reasons for denying that the settlement
should be excluded.tg3 Rather, the dissent concluded that Title VII
addressed tort-type rights and, therefore, damages awarded under it
should be excluded from gross income.194
V. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
The result reached by the majority in Burke has the effect of al-
lowing the remedies available to fix the personal nature of an injury.
Although neither the Code nor the legislative history provide gui-
dance on this issue, the regulation clearly steers the analysis toward
determining if the amount was received for a violation of a tort-type
right. Here the majority looked not at the violation of the right at
issue, but the nature of the damages plaintiffs could recover. The
majority held that employment discrimination was not a personal in-
jury simply because compensatory and punitive damages-tradi-
tional tort remedies-were not then expressly allowed as Title VII
damages. 195
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1879. In support of its rationale, the dissent stated "[it is the reason-
ably certain prospect of a back pay award that 'provide[s] the spur or catalyst which
causes employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment
practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of [discrim-
ination].'" Id. (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18
(1975)) (citation omitted).
192. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1878 (1992) (O'Connor, Thomas,
J.J., dissenting) (citing Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987); Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985)).
193. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1880-81 (1992) (O'Connor, Thomas,
J.J., dissenting). The dissent addressed and dismissed the majority's analysis that: (1)
the damages would have been taxable wages had there been no discrimination; (2)
the unavailability of jury trial bears against the tort-like nature of the claim; and (3)
Congress changed the purpose of Title VII with the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Id.
194. Id. at 1881.
195. Id. at 1873. The language of Title VII does not specifically exclude compen-
satory and punitive damages; this is the Court's limitation. See Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 182 n.4 (1989) (noting that a plaintiff in a Title VII suit
is limited to recovery of back pay). But cf. Williams v. Trans World Airlines, 660 F.2d
1267 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating that an award of compensatory damages is the proper
remedy for a deprivation of constitutional rights).
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By entering from the back door and fixing the nature of an injury
according to available damages rather than the violation involved,
the majority's analysis is flawed in two critical areas. First, available
remedies cannot transform a personal injury into an nonpersonal
one. Second, the decision undermines the policy of tax fairness and
the purpose behind the personal injury exclusion. Thus, the effects
of Burke will reach far beyond the few hundreds of dollars at stake to
the TVA employees in the case, and plaintiffs' attorneys should take
note.
A. It's Either a Personal Injury or It is Not
The Code allows taxpayers to exclude from gross income damages
received for personal injuries.19 6 The pertinent regulation, in effect
for decades, clarifies "personal injury" with reference to violations of
tort or tort-type rights.19 7 A tort is defined as a legal wrong commit-
ted upon a person or property independent of contractual obligations. 198
The broad definition of a tort as a "civil wrong, other than breach of
contract, for which the court will provide a remedy" was cited with
approval by the majority in United States v. Burke.199
In contrast, contractual liability is imposed to protect the singular
interest of enforcing promises. 20 0 One is generally free from enter-
ing into and may negotiate the specific terms of one's contractual
liability. Thus, contract and tort principles are in direct contrast to
each other: the former protects voluntary, specific promises of the
parties involved while the latter protects the common good.
The United States Supreme Court recognizes that Title VII, as
part of the Civil Rights Act, defines a legal duty that sounds basically
in tort.20 1 The preamble to Title VII states that "[t]he opportunity
for employment without discrimination . . . is a right of all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States, and ... it is the national
policy to protect the right of the individual to be free from such dis-
crimination."202 Because Title VII sounds basically in tort, it is
based on tort-like principles.
Courts have long held that unlawful discrimination based on those
categories protected by Title VII results in an injury to the individual
196. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1992).
197. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (amended 1970).
198. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974).
199. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1489 (6th ed. 1990).
200. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1870-71 (1992) (quoting W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 2 (1984)) (emphasis
added).
201. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1879 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
202. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
TITLE VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 2001, 2009 (1968) (quoted in
McGrath, supra note 93, at 190) (emphasis added).
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rights of a person.203 Even if the resulting injury is not physical or
tangible, it is still personal.o4 The logical conclusion is that a victim
of Title VII employment discrimination is personally injured. To
suggest otherwise sends a message to employers that the federal
government views broken legs more sympathetically than systematic
employment discrimination.
The majority in Burke indeed acknowledged that employment dis-
crimination results in personal injury by stating that "[i]t is beyond
question that discrimination in employment.., causes grave harm to
its victims."205 Compensation to victims of grave harm certainly
seems to be within the scope of "damages received for personal
injury."206
But the majority continued and looked at tort principles in refer-
ence to the remedies available-or not available in this case-to de-
termine whether discrimination results in personal injury. Because
the remedy was back pay received in lieu of taxable wages, the per-
sonal injury the employees suffered, which was based on a tort-like
claim, was mysteriously transformed into something else.
The Court's analysis proposes that, despite the personal nature of
an injury, the remedy available may depersonalize it. Under this
analysis, if a person breaks a leg due to another's negligence, brings
a personal injury suit against the tortfeasor, and is compensated for
lost wages, the remedy transforms the broken leg into something
other than a personal injury. Yet, in this situation, lost wages may be
excluded under § 104(a)(2). 207
The nature of a personal injury does not change simply because its
remedy is based on lost earnings.208 "Personal injury" should be
defined according to the right being violated, not the currently avail-
able remedies. Title VII protects tort-type rights, and its violation
results in personal injury. Thus, the damages received for that viola-
tion should be excluded from gross income under § 104(a)(2).
203. Burke, 929 F.2d at 1121; see also Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656
(1987); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189,
197 (1974); Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709, 711 (4th Cir. 1989).
204. See Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32, 40 (1972) (holding that injury result-
ing from a breach of contract is personal in nature).
205. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1872 (1992).
206. Id.
207. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). The damages received are excludable in this situation re-
gardless of whether received for lost earnings, medical expenses, or pain and suffer-
ing. LAWRENCE A. FROLIK, FEDERAL TAX ASPECTS OF INJURY, DAMAGE, AND Loss 1
(1987).
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B. Public Policy and Tax Fairness
The "in lieu of what" test used by the majority has certain logical
appeal from a strict tax perspective that seeks to tax all income. The
damages were received by the employees in lieu of the wages they
would have received absent the discriminatory conduct. These
wages would have been subject to tax. Thus allowing wages tax-free
in the form of damages would provide an employee with a windfall.
But the policy behind the personal injury exclusion specifically al-
lows a plaintiff a windfall in this situation. Since 1918, income re-
ceived as damages for personal injuries has been distinguished from
other income.209 The exclusion rests on the humanitarian desire not
to further burden those who have been injured.210 The logical "in
lieu of what" test has no place in determining the applicability of this
policy-driven exclusion.
The majority's "in lieu of what" test also results in an unfair appli-
cation of § 104(a)(2) because the test produces different outcomes
for different injuries. All damages, including lost wages, are excluda-
ble if the injury is physical.21, The exclusion applies even if the same
amount in regular wages would have been taxed if received in the
normal course of business. The lost wages merely represent an
amount lost by the taxpayer because of the tortfeasor's conduct that
resulted in the personal injury. Like lost wages, back pay also would
be taxed if received in the ordinary course of business. Back pay is
the amount lost by the employee because of the tortfeasor-em-
ployer's conduct that resulted in the personal injury. Section
104(a)(2) does not distinguish between physical and nonphysical in-
jury, yet the Court makes this distinction in Burke. The decision
treats two similarly situated taxpayers, both personally injured, dif-
ferently and undermines the basic goal of tax fairness and horizontal
equity.212 The Burke decision discriminates against a taxpayer who
has already been the victim of employment discrimination.
C. Long-Term Effects on the Personal Injury Exclusion
After Burke, back pay received from Title VII claims must be in-
cluded in income. If the additional remedies provided by the 1991
Amendment are available retroactively for a Title VII claimant, plain-
tiffs with pending cases may receive compensatory and punitive dam-
209. See Berkowitz & Greenstein, supra note 31. See also supra notes 33-35 and ac-
companying text.
210. Id.
211. Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50-51.
212. Courts consistently state that all personal injury victims should be treated
similarly. Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1123 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S.
Ct. 1867 (1992); Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 664 (3d Cir. 1990); Pistillo v.
Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145, 150 (6th Cir. 1990).
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ages. These damages, because they are traditional tort remedies and
are not received in lieu of taxable income, would be excluded. If the
additional remedies are not available retroactively, plaintiffs with
cases pending may receive only taxable back pay.
Future plaintiffs, with Title VII or any other claim where damages
are received for personal injury, may take steps so that the personal
injury exclusion is still available. First, complaints should be framed
so that a tort or tort-type right is clearly implicated, and the result of
its violation is a personal injury. Past Tax Court decisions have
shown that the framing of the complaint may determine the outcome
of the case.213 The amount sought to redress that claim should be
characterized as compensatory damages, rather than back pay for a
personal injury.
Second, settlement negotiations and documentation should clearly
state that the amount received is for personal injury and not back
pay. In Burke, the damages were never characterized as "back pay"
during settlement negotiations, yet when TVA distributed the
amount it withheld taxes.214 It was prudent of TVA to do this, be-
cause the burden of defending an action by the Service would other-
wise fall on the TVA.215 By withholding, the burden shifted to the
plaintiffs to prove that taxes should not have been withheld because
they came within the exclusion.
If not expressly documented as damages received for personal in-
jury, the district court will look at the intent of the payor to deter-
mine the purpose of the payment.2 16 In the employment setting this
allows the employer to justify withholding on the ground that it in-
tended the amount as back pay. Settlement documents should
clearly state that Title VII claimants seek compensatory damages for
the personal injury of employment discrimination.
Third, if the damages received are characterized as back pay,
claimants may argue that the back pay is merely the best measure of
the injury suffered, just as wages are a valid measure of compensa-
tory damages when the injury is physical. The Tax Court embraced
this argument in Threlkeld where an undeniably tort-type claim was at
issue. It stated that the amount of lost wages in a defamation claim
213. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
214. Burke v. United States, 90-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,203 at 83,746 (E.D.
Tenn., Mar. 20, 1990), rev'd, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1867
(1992). However, the employees sought back pay in their complaint because it was
the only monetary relief available to Title VII claimants at that time. Burke v. United
States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1120 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
215. It is interesting to note that Hutcheson's claim was paid separately, and TVA
did not withhold taxes. However, when TVA distributed the lump sum to the remain-
ing employees, it withheld taxes. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
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may be the best measure of the loss but, in no way, transforms the
claim.2 ' 7 With the expanded remedies now available under the 1991
amendment to the Civil Rights Act, the argument that damages re-
ceived under Title VII redress tort-type rights is strengthened. 21 8
Perhaps, then, Title VII claimants could receive parallel treatment
and be allowed to characterize back pay as simply the best measure
of their loss.
VI. CONCLUSION
The issue of what constitutes a "personal injury" for purposes of
§ 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code is left for courts to decide.
Courts have applied one of two tests: either the underlying claim test
or the "in lieu of what" test. The Court in United States v. Burke chose
the "in lieu of what" test to determine whether damages received for
an employment discrimination claim, brought under Title VII, may
be excluded from income.
The analysis in Burke allows a remedy to transform a personal in-
jury into something else. This undermines the public policy behind
the personal injury exclusion and offends general principles of tax
fairness. The decision creates ambiguities about the application of
the personal injury exclusion now that Title VII has been amended
to allow traditional tort remedies. It also leaves unanswered the
question of whether back pay received in conjunction with compen-
satory or punitive damages would be excludable as it is with other
personal injuries.
The Court could have resolved these ambiguities by focusing on
the underlying claim rather than the type of remedy currently al-
lowed to redress the claim. The Court could have found that be-
cause employment discrimination causes personal injury and
because a Title VII claim is based on tort-type principles, the dam-
ages could be excluded. Examining the type of claim would have
avoided the transformation of personal injury into nonpersonal in-
jury, would have been fair and equitable, and would not have created
more ambiguities. United States v. Burke did not resolve the issue of
what constitutes a "personal injury" for the purposes of the
§ 104(a)(2) personal injury damages exclusion.
217. Threlkeld. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1299 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81
(6th Cir. 1988); see also Bent v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 236, 250 (1986), affid, 835
F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987).
218. The majority's decision effectively proposes that what was not a personal in-
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